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I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
II. THE METAMORPHOSIS OF TRANSNATIONAL
LITIGATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
III. THE ELUSIVE PROTECTION OF DIFFUSE RIGHTS IN
ECUADOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
IV. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

153
156

R

172
176

R

I. INTRODUCTION
The conventional debate on transnational dispute resolution
has been mostly centered on the use of traditional means such as
litigation, and more recently arbitration.2 These are generally
perceived to be among the most favored institutionalized mechanisms available for the processing of complex disputes. In the particular case of litigation, the attention of scholars and
practitioners generally revolves around the interpretation and
application of national rules regarding jurisdiction,3 the transmission of judicial documents,4 the taking of evidence,5 and the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments,6 among other
1. Associate Professor of Law, Florida International University School of Law.
The author wishes to thank the participants on the panel “Comparative Studies on
Disputing Behavior” (RC 12) held at the XVII ISA World Congress of Sociology in
Yokohama, Japan, for their valuable insight and comments to earlier drafts of this
work.
2. See generally, Frederick Brown & Catherine A. Rogers, The Role of Arbitration
in Resolving Transnational Disputes: A Survey of Trends in the People’s Republic of
China, 15 BERKELEY J. INT’L LAW 329 (1997); THOMAS CARBONNEAU, RESOLVING
TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTES THROUGH INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (1988); Christopher
A. Whytock, The Arbitration-Litigation Relationship in Transnational Dispute
Resolution: Empirical Insights from the U.S. Federal Courts, 2 WORLD ARBITRATION &
MEDIATION REV. 39 (2008).
3. See, e.g., Raymond Paretzky, A New Approach to Jurisdictional Questions in
Transnational Litigation in U. S. Courts, 10 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 663 (2014).
4. See, e.g., JOHN OWEN HALEY, FUNDAMENTALS OF TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION:
THE UNITED STATES, CANADA, JAPAN & THE EUROPEAN UNION, 533 (2012).
5. See, e.g. id.; Gary B. Born, The Hague Evidence Convention Revisited:
Reflections on its Role in U.S. Civil Procedure, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 77 (1994).
6. See, e.g., Samuel P. Baumgarter, Changes in the European Union’s Regime of
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aspects. Looking at the formal legal dimension of transnational
dispute resolution is important, but neither litigation nor arbitration occurs in a vacuum.7 The choice of where and how to process
a legal dispute depends on an array of factors both internal and
external to the parties, including their socioeconomic status, their
needs, aspirations and interests, their position vis-à-vis the other
party, and their experience, to name a few. This decision is also
conditioned by the political, social, and economic conditions affecting the parties and other stakeholders.
Once the parties have chosen a specific institutionalized
mechanism for their dispute that does not necessarily mean that
they intend to process their differences exclusively through a particular method or forum and rule out every other process. To the
contrary, the parties to a legal dispute will rely on as many dispute-processing mechanisms as they deem necessary to obtain leverage toward a favorable outcome. Complex transnational
disputes offer a prime example of multiple combinations of this
interplay between several mechanisms and fora. These are cases
that often encompass several legal issues, which require the application of the laws of more than one jurisdiction or legal system,
where the number of parties and other stakeholders tends to be
higher than in most ordinary disputes, and where the stakes are
also high. Even though the utilization of different procedural
means by the parties is often deliberate and follows a preconceived strategy, the parties can rarely control or even predict the
outcome.
This article intends to explore the interplay between different
dispute processing mechanisms and fora in the realm of transnational litigation, through the lens of the Chevron-Ecuador legal
saga. My goal is to discuss the transformation of a transnational
complex case and the challenges faced by the parties, their procedural strategies, and the perceived advantages of the different
mechanisms. In this regard, I will also address the development of
mechanisms for the protection of diffuse rights involving the environment; the role of the courts in supervising compliance with
judicial remedies, their engagement in activities that go beyond
Recognizing and Enforcing Foreign Judgments and Transnational Litigation in the
United States, 18 SW J. INT’L L. (2012); Christopher A. Whytock & Cassandra Burke
Robinson, Forum Non Conveniens and the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 111
COLUM. L. REV. 1145 (2011).
7. Manuel A. Gómez, The Global Chase: Seeking the Recognition and
Enforcement of the Lago Agrio Judgment Outside of Ecuador, 1 STAN. J. COMPLEX
LITIG. 429 (2013) [hereinafter Gómez, Global Chase].

\\jciprod01\productn\I\IAL\46-2\IAL202.txt

unknown

Seq: 3

3-JUN-15

2015] SOUR BATTLE IN LAGO AGRIO & BEYOND

15:39

155

their traditional role as simple adjudicators; and the role of privately formed entities in the administration and supervision of
monetary awards in Ecuador.
I use the term Chevron-Ecuador legal saga to convey the
array of legal proceedings utilized across different jurisdictions in
connection with a dispute that arose from the alleged tortious conduct of the oil multinational Texaco while exploring and
extracting oil in the Ecuadorean Amazon between 1964 and 1992.
Texaco was particularly blamed for causing property damage, personal injuries, increased risks of cancer and other diseases to tens
of thousands of indigenous peoples residing in the Oriente region
of Ecuador and adjacent areas in Peru, and also for degrading and
destroying the environment.8
The opening act of the Chevron-Ecuador legal saga was the
filing of two class action complaints in the mid-nineties by a group
of Ecuadorean and Peruvian citizens against Texaco in a United
States federal court. After a pretrial phase that lasted several
years, and pursuant to Texaco’s own formal request, the cases
were jointly dismissed in favor of the courts of Ecuador and Peru.
A year later, the plaintiffs re-filed the case in Ecuador against
Chevron, as Texaco’s successor-in-interest. What appeared to be a
straightforward summary proceeding under Ecuadorean law
became a judicial hydra of sorts that sprouted outside the courtroom, beyond the initial parties, and across several jurisdictions
including the United States, and later on the Netherlands,
Canada, Brazil, and Argentina.
Starting in the mid-2000s, the threat of a multi-billion dollar
adverse judgment looming over Chevron’s head drove the American corporation to mount a vigorous counterattack against the
plaintiffs and anyone else who supported or benefited from their
cause. The multi-front legal battle is still underway. Chevron’s
legal campaign comprised at least two investor-state arbitration
proceedings in international tribunals, civil litigation under the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) in
federal courts, an injunction to block the enforcement of the Ecuadorean judgment in the United States, numerous judicial petitions
to obtain evidence for use in foreign or international tribunals,
and a petition before the United States Trade Representative.
Plaintiffs, on the other hand, had supplemented their judicial
strategy with a forceful public relations campaign that included a
8. Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
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documentary film, which later on became the epicenter of a public
scandal and provided the foundation for Chevron’s RICO lawsuit.
Plaintiffs also pursued a multi-country enforcement strategy of
the $8.6 Billion Ecuadorean judgment entered against Chevron in
2011, which at the time of writing they are still attempting to collect. The most recent move by plaintiffs has been the filing of a
formal complaint against Chevron executives with the Office of
the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court.
The Ecuadorean judgment entered against Chevron is
unprecedented in several ways. First, by all measures it is the
largest and most complex award rendered against a multinational
oil company in Ecuador, and perhaps in the entire South American region. Second, it is the first major court ruling in Ecuador
regarding the protection of the diffuse rights of indigenous peoples
under the Environmental Management Act of 1999. And third,
this is also the first time an Ecuadorean court has devised a judicially supervised mechanism to administer and disburse a
remediation award through a privately formed entity (Amazon
Defense Front, or “ADF”). The unique circumstances surrounding
the Chevron-Ecuador legal saga, which has been marred by multiple allegations of corruption, political influence, and professional
misconduct both in Ecuador and the United States has had a
major effect on the fate of this case, it has obviously reshaped the
strategies of the parties, and has also cast a cloud of doubt on the
legitimacy of the court proceedings and the lawfulness of the remedies issued.

II. THE METAMORPHOSIS

OF

TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION

It is not an exaggeration to say that not even in their wildest
dreams the parties to the Chevron-Ecuador legal saga could have
predicted that their confrontation would last more than two
decades, involve several jurisdictions, cost hundreds of millions of
dollars in legal fees, and still not be resolved. At first glance, the
class action complaints filed in 1993 and 1994 in the Southern
District of New York on behalf of Maria Aguinda, Gabriel
Ashanga Jota and others against Texaco were nothing out of the
ordinary.9 After all, foreign plaintiffs have always been attracted
to the courts of the United States “as a moth is drawn to the
light.”10 While there are no statistics available as to how many
9. See id.
10. Smith Kline & French Laboratories, Ltd. v. Bloch [1983] 2 All E.R. 72, 74, 1
W.L.R. 730 (C.A. 1982) (Lord Denning M.R.).
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class actions lawsuits are filed in United States courts—both federal and state—on behalf of foreign plaintiff every year, the general perception is that the number is on the rise.11 Foreign
plaintiffs, and particularly those from Latin America, seem to find
enough incentives to bring their claims to United States courts
instead of litigating in their own countries.
The perceived advantages of the American civil justice system
that appeal to foreign litigants are several.12 An important one is
the ease of access to adequate legal representation in the United
States and to its courts. Unlike many foreign jurisdictions, the
United States allows lawyers to take cases on a contingency fee
basis, which is generally perceived to enable litigants without sufficient financial means to attain legal representation that would
be otherwise prohibitive and to pursue their claims in court. In
most Latin American jurisdictions, contingency fees have been
traditionally frowned upon or banned outright because of the idea
that lawyers should not acquire a personal interest in the matters
for which they have been hired. To make up for this shortcoming
and to facilitate access to justice, some Latin American nations
have sponsored the creation of legal aid societies, but their reach
tends to be very limited. Besides, these organizations generally
lack the financial incentive to litigate because—unlike American
lawyers—they are not supposed to obtain profit from their activities. Other forms of litigation financing widely available in the
United States such as non-recourse loans provided by professional
litigation funders are also unavailable in Latin America where
this industry is yet to develop. A third possible financial upside of
the United States litigation system is the absence of a loser-pays
rule, which minimizes the pressure on the parties regarding the
shifting of legal fees.13
Another perceived advantage of the American civil litigation
system vis-à-vis that of Latin American countries is the existence
of procedural tools such as discovery in the United States, which
11. Wolfgang Wurmnest, Foreign Private Plaintiffs, Global Conspiracies, and the
Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Antitrust Law, 28 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV.
205, 206 (2004-2005); Manuel A. Gómez, Will the Birds Stay South? The Rise of Class
Actions and Other Forms of Group Litigation Across Latin America, 43(3) U. MIAMI
INTER-AM. L. REV. 481 (2012) [hereinafter Gómez, Group Litigation in Latin America].
12. Manuel A. Gómez, Like Migratory Birds: Latin American Claimants in U.S.
Courts and the Ford-Firestone Rollover Litigation, 11 SW. J. L. & TRADE AM. 281
(2005).
13. Id. at 297.
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presumptively facilitates settlement.14 Unlike most of Latin
America, the United States recognizes class actions, which enable
the aggregation of claims—which are otherwise impracticable—
into a single litigation, and extends the res judicata effect of the
decision on the merits beyond the actual parties to include any
absent class members who have not opted out. Trial by jury is
also a common feature of American civil litigation that is perceived as advantageous by foreign plaintiffs who deem jurors as
generally sympathetic to the plaintiff’s side, and are presumptively disposed to award significantly larger sums than a single
judge elsewhere. Moreover, the United States is one of the few
jurisdictions where obtaining punitive or exemplary damages is
possible, unlike in Latin American jurisdictions where the concept
is extraneous and often deemed contrary to their public policy.
In addition to the above reasons, the fact that defendant Texaco Corporation was an American company with assets in the
United States and therefore within reach of a local court for
enforcement purposes, is probably what drove Aguinda, Jota, and
the other class representatives to bring their claim in the United
States. Their choice of forum, however, was not without risk
because the United States also recognizes the doctrine of forum
non conveniens, which is generally used as a tool to remove cases
from United States courts in favor of a foreign jurisdiction.
According to this doctrine, despite having jurisdiction over all of
the parties, an American court may dismiss a case in favor of
another available forum (i.e. that also has jurisdiction), which is
considered “more convenient,” or adequate to the private interest
of the parties or the public interest of the fora involved.15 Conversely, the acceptance of the forum non conveniens doctrine in
Latin America is scant.16
Filing a motion to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds
14. See, e.g., Kuo-Chang Huang, Does Discovery Promote Settlement? An
Empirical Answer, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 241 (2009).
15. See Piper Aircraft v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981); Gulf Oil v. Gilbert, 330 U.S.
501 (1947).
16. See, e.g., Henry Saint Dahl, Forum Non Conveniens, Latin America and
Blocking Statutes, 35 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 21 (2003-2004); LUIS COVA ARRIA,
LA DOCTRINA DEL FORUM NON CONVENIENS EN EL DERECHO ANGLO-AMERICANO Y LAS
BASES DE LA JURISDICCIÓN EN VENEZUELA: ESTUDIO COMPARADO ESPECIALMENTE
REFERIDO A ASUNTOS MARITIMOS, IN LIBRO HOMENAJE A LA MEMORIA DE JOAQUÍN
SÁNCHEZ COVISA 40 (1975); but see, Victor Hugo Guerra Hernández, La Jurisdicción
Venezolana en Materia Extracontractual y la Doctrina del Forum Non Conveniens, in
Estudios de Derecho Procesal Civil Homenaje a Humberto Cuenca (Tribunal Supremo
de Justicia: Caracas, 2002) at 448.
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is one of the premier procedural tactics available to American
defendants to delay the process, and ultimately send cases back to
their countries of origin where they most likely will not be re-filed.
This is not to say that most motions to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds are meritless or used to manipulate the process
and hinder plaintiff’s chances to obtain any redress. Its apparent
advantages, however, are tempting to an American defendant who
is aware that the reason why a foreign plaintiff has filed a lawsuit
in this country is precisely because of the obstacles of litigating in
their home forum.
The use of forum shopping strategies in litigation is obviously
not exclusive of powerful corporate defendants. Foreign plaintiffs
of all sorts are, too, obviously prone to take advantage of the
United States civil litigation system, and courts are cognizant of
that reality. For example, one of the most common tactics used by
foreign plaintiffs is the filing of lawsuits in so-called “plaintiff
friendly jurisdictions,” which otherwise have no connection with
the dispute or with any of the parties. The judicial solution in the
context of the forum non conveniens doctrine as applied by United
States courts has been to give less deference to the choice of forum
made by foreign plaintiffs,17 which facilitates the dismissal of the
case in favor of a foreign jurisdiction, or in some instances, its
removal to another jurisdiction within the United States.18
In the event of a dismissal of a case in favor of a foreign country, there is a perception that a significant number of dismissed
cases are never re-filed in the alternative forum, thus leading to
the belief that a forum non conveniens dismissal is really dispositive on the entire case.19 In order to minimize this risk, United
States courts always retain jurisdiction over the parties even after
dismissing the litigation. The idea is to ensure that if by any reason a plaintiff is not able to re-file the case in the foreign court, the
17. See, e.g., Harry Litman, Considerations of Choice of Law in the Doctrine of
Forum Non Conveniens, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 565 (1986).
18. See, e.g., Republic of Bolivia v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc., 39 F. Supp. 2d
1008 (S.D. Tex. 1999).
19. See Cassandra Burke Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens on Appeal: The Case
for Interlocutory Review, 18 SW. J. INT’L L. 445, 449 (2012) (“because dismissal often
ends the case, defendants have historically had a strong incentive to file a forum non
conveniens motion in nearly every case with a plausible alternative forum”); see also
David W. Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens in America and England: A rather
fantastic fiction, 103 L.Q. REV. 398, 418-420 (1987); but see, Cassandra Burke
Robinson, Transnational Litigation and Institutional Choice, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1081,
1131 (2010).
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United States courts are still available and the plaintiff is not left
without any remedy.
In any instance, regardless of whether an American defendant is able to effectively prevail in obtaining dismissal of the litigation in favor of a foreign forum, the time it takes to argue the
motion in the United States court might also have a debilitating
effect on a plaintiff with limited resources. The motion to dismiss
filed by Texaco in the Aguinda and Jota class actions, for example,
took several years to litigate until the case was finally dismissed
in favor of Ecuador and Peru, upon the United States District
Court’s conclusion that the balance of private interest factors
swayed toward the foreign fora. One reason for such lengthy process in the Aguinda and Jota litigation was the vast amount of
witnesses that had to be deposed, and the tens of thousands of
documents submitted into evidence “in an effort to establish a
meaningful nexus between the United States and the decisions
and practices complained of.”20 Ironically, it was precisely the
availability of discovery, which as I said earlier has been generally
perceived by foreign plaintiffs as an advantage of American civil
litigation that caused such a long delay in the pretrial phase of
Aguinda and Jota.
Despite their taxing experience in American courts, the Ecuadorean plaintiffs were not deterred from re-filing the case back
home, although the Peruvian claims had a different fate for they
were never pursued in the alternative forum, thus validating the
common perception about the dispositive nature of the forum non
conveniens dismissal to which I referred earlier. In any case, it is
not hard to imagine how undesirable would be to any foreign
plaintiff whose primary goal for coming to the United States was
precisely because of the possibility of obtaining swift justice, to
engage in a prolonged legal fight for almost seven years just to see
their case dismissed and have to re-file it elsewhere.
As it commonly occurs in forum non conveniens cases, the
District Court conditioned its dismissal to certain conditions, to
wit: (i) that Texaco would waive any statute of limitations-based
defense that matured between the filing of the class actions and
sixty days after dismissal, (ii) that Texaco consented to personal
jurisdiction in Ecuador and Peru to be sued by members of the
putative classes and willingness to accept service of process in
those jurisdictions, and (iii) that the parties were able to utilize
20. Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 534, 535 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
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the discovery obtained in the United States in the actions to be
filed in Ecuador or Peru.21 Plaintiffs filed a consolidated appeal
from the judgments dismissing the two putative class actions but
had no success, and the judgment was confirmed by the Court of
Appeals on August 16, 2002.22
In 2003, Maria Aguinda, and the other Ecuadorean plaintiffs
filed a complaint in the Provincial Court of Justice of Sucumbı́os
against the Chevron Corporation, which two years earlier had
merged with Texaco and was thus regarded as its successor in
interest. The Complaint was grounded on Ecuador’s Environmental Management Act of 1999 (Ley de Gestion Ambiental de 1999, or
“EMA”),23 a relatively new statute, which passage was credited to
the persistent lobbying efforts of the ADF and the Center for Economic and Social Rights (“CEDES”) on behalf of Aguinda’s cause.24
As a result of this special statute and the passage of the International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention 169,25 the Ecuadorean court system became “more sympathetic than ever before to
the plaintiffs and their plight.”26 Notwithstanding the suspicion
that EMA was somewhat tailor-made to the Aguinda case, its passage was generally positive because it broadened the scope of the
protection of collective rights in Ecuador, and also advanced the
cause for enabling aggregate litigation in the region.
Article 43 of EMA essentially gave plaintiffs standing to bring
suit on behalf of others similarly situated vis-à-vis any violation to
the environment attributable to Chevron.27 This procedural vehicle is the Ecuadorean version of a class action although its scope is
much narrower than its American counterpart contained in Rule
23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.28 Aguinda was also the
first claim brought under this statute against a multinational corporation, so it was unchartered territory for the court and the parties. Unlike the other forms of judicial protection allowed under
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. at 534.
Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002).
LEY DE GESTIÓN AMBIENTAL, Law No. 99-37.
SUZANA SAWYER, EMPIRE/MULTITURE-STATE/CIVIL SOCIETY: RETHINKING
TOPOGRAPHIES OF POWER THROUGH TRANSNATIONAL CONNECTIVITY IN ECUADOR AND
BEYOND, IN INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, CIVIL SOCIETY, AND THE NEO-LIBERAL STATE IN
LATIN AMERICA 77 (Edward F. Fischer ed., 2009).
25. Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent
Countries, 1989 (“ILO Convention 169”), available at: http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/
en/f?pNoRMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_INSTRUMENT_ID:312314.
26. SAWYER, supra note 24, at 77.
27. LEY DE GESTIÓN AMBIENTAL, Law No. 99-37, art. 43.
28. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
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EMA, which were limited to injunctive relief,29 the action filed by
Aguinda and others allowed them to seek monetary compensation
in addition to an incentive equivalent to ten percent of the total
award for the representative party.30
EMA established that the proceedings were to be summary
and oral, as opposed to a full-blown trial. The statute also gave the
trial judge ample powers to order expert reports, calculate damages, and determine the administration and disbursement of any
judgment monies.31 The court with jurisdiction over the dispute
was located in the town of Lago Agrio, which is close to where the
victims resided, and where the alleged tortious conduct had
occurred. Ironically, this put Chevron at a significant tactical disadvantage with regard to the plaintiffs, despite the fact that Texaco had spent several years arguing so vehemently that the action
be dismissed in favor of Ecuador.
The manner in which the Ecuadorean process was conducted,
including the increased politization of the dispute, and the conduct of certain members of the plaintiff legal team, became the
source of a major controversy in the years to come and the basis
for Chevron’s subsequent collateral attacks. At some point, plaintiffs expressed somewhat cynically that Chevron got what it (Texaco) had bargained for, so it should not be allowed back into the
United States when their Ecuadorean litigation went south.32
However, it would be fair to assume that when Texaco fought for
the dismissal of the Aguinda and Jota class actions in New York,
the Ecuadorean system that they had in mind was very different
from the one that their successor Chevron experienced a few years
later. This modification in the circumstances more than justified
a change in Chevron’s litigation strategy and, perhaps unexpectedly, transformed the initial dispute into something entirely different and disproportionately bigger than what any of the parties
might have anticipated.
As the suspicion of bias, judicial corruption, and adverse political pressure against Chevron became stronger, and the imminence of a multi-billion dollar judgment against the multinational
company became evident, their legal team decided to launch a
counter-offensive in the United States. As in any other legal sys29.
30.
31.
32.

LEY DE GESTIÓN AMBIENTAL, Law No. 99-37, arts. 41, 42.
See id. at art. 43.
Id.
Roger Parloff, Evidence of fraud mounts in Ecuadorean suit against Chevron,
FORTUNE (Sept 13, 2010), http://archive.fortune.com/2010/09/13/news/international/
chevron_ecuador_litigation.fortune/index.htm.
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tem, Ecuadorean law guarantees the right to file an appeal and to
seek other judicial remedies in case of an adverse judgment and
this would be the natural course of action for a defendant to follow
in any litigation. Although Chevron did exercise their right to
appeal in Ecuador where the main litigation took place, their
main focus changed to other for a that offered the necessary procedural tools to mount a multi-faceted battle.
One front was international, and it consisted in the filing of
two successive demands for arbitration by Chevron against the
Republic of Ecuador (“ROE”) based on the alleged breach of certain obligations under a bilateral investment treaty (“USA-ROE
BIT”) signed between the latter and the United States of America.
Pursuant to the terms of the treaty, the arbitral proceedings were
filed with the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”) to be administered under the Arbitration
Rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law UNCITRAL. The first complaint was filed in 2006 and
decided five years later in favor of Chevron and Texaco33, and the
second was filed in 2009 and it is still pending of a final decision
on the merits.
Chevron’s main assertion in the first arbitration was that
ROE had breached the USA-ROE BIT through the conduct of its
government and the inaction of its courts in relation to seven
domestic court cases involving TexPet—an Ecuadorean subsidiary
formed by Texaco to carry out its operations in Ecuador—and
pending for more than fifteen years in their docket without proper
resolution.34 Furthermore, Chevron claimed that in addition to
constituting a specific violation of the USA-ROE BIT, such undue
delay and manifestly unjust decisions against a foreign investor in
Ecuador such as Chevron and Texaco were tantamount to a denial
of justice, which in turn constituted a violation of both Ecuadorean domestic law and customary international law.35 The Ecuadorean litigation referred to by Chevron and Texaco in their
demand for arbitration resulted from five lawsuits commenced
“against the government of Ecuador between 1991 and 1993 relating to . . . allegations of over-contribution of crude oil to domestic
33. Chevron Corp. and Texaco Petroleum Co. v. The Republic of Ecuador, PCA
Case No. 34877, Final Award (Aug. 31, 2011), available at http://www.italaw.com/
sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0154.pdf [hereinafter Chevron v. Ecuador Final
Award].
34. Id. at ¶ 35.
35. Id. at ¶¶ 35, 37.
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consumption.”36 In addition, there were two other cases “one
relating to a force majeure issue (Case 8-92) and the other concerning the alleged breach of the 1986 Refinancing Agreement
(Case 983-03).”37 The total amount in dispute in these seven cases
was US $553,456,850.81.”38
Although none of the aforementioned Ecuadorean court cases
appeared to have any direct connection with the environmental
damages that formed the basis of Aguinda’s tort action, they did
arise out of the same underlying oil extracting activities between
Texaco and the ROE in the Oriente region of Ecuador. As a result,
it should come as no surprise that Chevron would use the circumstances surrounding these lawsuits to build their counter-attack
in response to the Lago Agrio litigation, especially in a way that
weaved the participation of the ROE into the theory of their case:
that Aguinda’s environmental litigation was nothing more than
part of a corrupt enterprise to extort billions of dollars from the
multinational oil company.39 Bringing the ROE onboard and
assigning it a role in Chevron’s misfortunes in some other Ecuadorean litigation would later help Chevron build the foundation for
the second ICSID arbitration filed in 2009, now in direct connection with the Aguinda litigation.40
The basis for this second arbitration was the alleged attempt
of the ROE “to shift to Chevron Ecuador’s own contractual share
of liability for any remaining environmental impacts from the pre1992 activities of the Consortium,”41 and “the responsibility for
impact caused by Petroecuador’s own oil operations since 1992, as
well as impact caused by government-sanctioned colonization and
agricultural and industrial exploitation of the Amazonian
region.”42 More specifically, Chevron asserted that “Ecuador has
pursued a coordinated strategy with the Lago Agrio plaintiffs that
36. Id. at ¶ 46.
37. Id.
38. Id. at ¶ 47.
39. Amended Complaint for Plaintiff at ¶ 1, Chevron Corp. v. Donziger et. al, 768
F. Supp. 2d 581 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 11 Civ. 0691) [hereinafter Chevron’s RICO
Complaint”] (“Over the course of several years, defendants, Steven Donziger and his
co-defendants and co-conspirators have sought to extort, defraud, and otherwise
tortuously injure plaintiff Chevron by means of a plan they conceived and
substantially executed in the United States”).
40. Chevron Corp. and Texaco Petroleum Co. v. The Republic of Ecuador, PCA
Case No. 2009-23, Claimants’ Notice of Arbitration (Sept. 23, 2009), available at
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0155_0.pdf [hereinafter
Chevron v. Ecuador Claimants’ Notice].
41. Id. at ¶ 3.
42. Id.
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involves Ecuador’s various organs of State,”43 including the executive and judicial branches. Regarding the latter, the statement of
claim accused the Ecuadorean courts of conducting “the Lago
Agrio litigation in total disregard of Ecuadorean law, international standards of fairness, and Chevron’s basic due process and
natural justice rights, and in apparent coordination with the executive branch and the Lago Agrio plaintiffs.”44 All of this, Chevron
and Texaco concluded, “violates the terms of the Ecuador-United
States BIT and the terms of the investment agreements between
Ecuador and TexPet.”45
On the other hand, the ROE has defended itself by alleging
that Chevron’s strategy is simply “to avoid responsibility for the
degradation of the Ecuadorean Amazon”46 and that their use of
arbitration as a collateral proceeding is “to avoid liability to parties not present here,”47 in reference to Aguinda and the other
alleged victims.
Despite the fact that Aguinda and the other plaintiffs are not
parties to the arbitration, with these proceedings Chevron clearly
aimed to set the stage to seek interim measures directed at
thwarting any adverse outcome resulting from the Aguinda litigation in the Sucumbı́os court. In fact, as early as April 1, 2010, and
in several other occasions during the next few years, Chevron
asked the arbitral tribunal to order the ROE to take all measures
at its disposal to prevent or suspend the enforcement of any judgment adverse to Chevron originating from the court handling the
Aguinda litigation.48 So far, the arbitral panel has sided with
Chevron on this issue, and as of the time of writing this article,
has issued at least four interim awards ordering the ROE to take
all measures to suspend enforcement of the US $8.6 Billion Lago
Agrio judgment.49 The ROE has repeatedly argued that fulfilling
43. Id. at ¶ 4.
44. Id.
45. Id. at ¶ 5.
46. Chevron Corp. and Texaco Petroleum Co. v. The Republic of Ecuador, PCA
Case No. 34877, Track 2 Supplemental Counter-Memorial on the Merits of the
Republic of Ecuador, (Nov. 7, 2014), available at http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/
files/case-documents/italaw4095.pdf [hereinafter Chevron v. Ecuador Supp. CounterMemorial].
47. Id. at ¶ 1.
48. See, e.g., Chevron Corp. and Texaco Petroleum Co. v. The Republic of Ecuador,
PCA Case No. 2009-23, Claimants’ Request for Interim Measures (Apr. 1, 2010),
available at http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0159.pdf.
49. See, e.g., Chevron Corp. and Texaco Petroleum Co. v. The Republic of Ecuador,
PCA Case No. 2009-23, First Interim Award on Interim Measures (Jan. 25, 2012),
available at http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0173.pdf;
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Chevron’s demands would violate the ROE’s own Constitution and
laws.50 The ROE has further asserted, “[e]ach measure would
require circumventing established judicial procedure in direct violation of Article 168 of the Constitution. Such violations would
lead to administrative, civil, and criminal liability for the entities
or individuals who carried out the claimants’ demanded interference with the judiciary.”51
In light of the complexity and scope of the issues presented to
the arbitral tribunal, since April of 2012, the proceedings were
bifurcated so one track would be devoted to address the legal
interpretation and legal effect of certain Settlement Agreements
entered between the parties in 1995.52 The second track, on the
other hand, would be devoted to “all extant issues that may be
required finally to decide the Parties’ dispute.”53 As mentioned
earlier, the second BIT arbitration is still underway, and a decision on the merits is yet to be rendered. Notwithstanding, Chevron has relied on the jurisdictional authority of the arbitral
tribunal to intensify their collateral attack geared to prevent
Aguinda and others from collecting the US $8.6 Billion judgment
granted by the Sucumbı́os court in February of 2011.54
The use of an investment arbitration-related claim as a strategy to block the enforcement of a domestic court judgment was a
creative move by Chevron’s lawyers but also a sign of the times.
In recent years, international arbitration and litigation have
become more interdependent than ever before. The idea of interChevron Corp. and Texaco Petroleum Co. v. The Republic of Ecuador, PCA Case No.
2009-23, Second Interim Award on Interim Measures (Feb. 16, 2012), available at
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0174_0.pdf; Chevron
Corp. and Texaco Petroleum Co. v. The Republic of Ecuador, PCA Case No. 2009-23,
Third Interim Award on Interim Measures (Feb. 27, 2012), available at http://
www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0175.pdf; Chevron Corp. and
Texaco Petroleum Co. v. The Republic of Ecuador, PCA Case No. 2009-23, Fourth
Interim Award on Interim Measures (Feb. 7, 2013), available at http://www.italaw
.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw1274.pdf.
50. See, e.g., Chevron Corp. and Texaco Petroleum Co. v. The Republic of Ecuador,
PCA Case No. 2009-23, Respondent’s Letter to the Tribunal (Jan. 9, 2012), available
at http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0172.pdf.
51. Id. at 6.
52. Chevron Corp. and Texaco Petroleum Co. v. The Republic of Ecuador, PCA
Case No. 2009-23, Procedural Order No. 10 (Apr. 9, 2012), available at http://
www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0913.pdf.
53. Id. at ¶ 2.
54. Maria Aguinda y otros v. Chevron Corporation, Sentencia definitiva, Corte
Provincial de Justicia Sucumbı́os, Sala Unica de la Corte Provincial de Justicia de
Sucumbı́os, February 14, 2011, file 2003-0002 [hereinafter Aguinda v. Chevron,
Sucumbı́os Judgment, February 14 2011].
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national arbitration and transnational litigation as two separate
and totally independent procedural avenues that can only be used
in a mutually exclusive manner is not true anymore. National
courts are essential in the life of international arbitration not only
because they interpret and help carrying out the parties’ will to
submit themselves to arbitration and help ensure that the arbitral
process goes without hiccups, but more importantly because they
give effect—by way of granting recognition and enforcement—to
the final awards issued by arbitral tribunals.
On the other hand, as we can learn from the Chevron-Ecuador legal saga, the power of arbitral tribunals can be used, in turn,
to monitor the performance of national courts and other state
organs, and—at least in theory—to protect the parties from judicial abuse, denial of justice, and offer them appropriate redress.
Put more simply, national courts are relied upon to assist arbitral
tribunals and guarantee that the proceedings go according to the
parties’ will, and conversely, arbitral tribunals can also be used to
ensure that national courts act properly. The second arbitration
commenced by Chevron against the REO is precisely geared to
remedy a purported treaty violation stemming from actions attributed to Ecuador’s national courts and other state organs. But
even if Chevron were to prevail in its claims, the only apparent
way for it to obtain satisfaction would be if a national court (presumptively, from Ecuador itself) agreed to recognize and enforce
the award issued by the arbitral panel;55 a typical catch-22 situation.56 In any case, and regardless of the ultimate outcome of the
Chevron-Ecuador dispute, the use of arbitration in tandem with
litigation, as opposed to as an alternative, might be attractive to
certain parties who—like Chevron in this case—choose to combine
different mechanisms as part of a broader strategy to pursue a
specific goal.
As the legal battle between Chevron, Aguinda, and now the
ROE expanded from one forum to another, the case gained more
attention in the media. Taking advantage of the technology, each
side launched or participated in dedicated websites, blogs, and
print media. The pinnacle of this strategy was the making of a
documentary film by director Joe Berlinger with financing from
55. See 330 UNTS 38, 49–51 (1958).
56. The term “catch-22” denotes a quandary that is unsolvable because of a
problem inherent to that same situation. Catch 22 definition, OXFORD LEARNER’S
DICTIONARIES, http://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/us/definition/english/
catch-22 (last visited March 18, 2015).
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Russell De Leon, one of the plaintiffs’ supporters. The film was
released on January of 2009 and entered into at least fifteen film
festivals.57
As the film’s main content was the progress of the legal case
in Ecuador, many of the scenes showed meetings of plaintiffs’ lawyers, and interviews with people involved in the litigation. After
noticing the mismatch between certain scenes that originally
appeared in the film but were cut from later versions, Chevron’s
lawyers sought a judicial order to obtain discovery from the film
director, which resulted in a federal judge in the Southern District
of New York ordering the release of hundreds of hours of outtakes
for further use in the foreign proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1782.58
The result of this expedition was the exposure of numerous
scenes showing Steven Donziger and other members of the plaintiffs’ legal team engaged in ethically questionable behavior that
further compromised the integrity of the Ecuadorean proceedings,
and later served as the basis for one more lawsuit filed by Chevron
in the same New York federal court that years earlier had dismissed the Aguinda litigation in favor of Ecuador. The new complaint, filed on February 1, 2011, was grounded in RICO59 and
based on Chevron’s theory that all the activities led by Aguinda
and others were part of an ongoing criminal organization to extort
and defraud the multinational company with “a sham litigation in
Lago Agrio, Ecuador, claiming to seek money damages from ‘collective environmental rights’ of the ‘affected’ ‘communities’ to
remediate alleged petroleum contamination in Ecuador’s Oriente
region.”60
The complaint named a long list of individuals as co-defendants and co-conspirators led by United States plaintiff lawyer
Steven Donziger; other American law firms such as Kohn Swift &
Graf, P.C., Emery Celli Brinckerhoff & Abady, LLP, Motley Rice
LLC, and Patton Boggs LLP; the environmental firm Stratus Consulting and its principals; several environmental activists including Amazon Watch and Rainforest Action Network; public
relations consultants; third party funders; and several Ecuado57. Awards and Festivals, CRUDE: A JOE BERLINGER FILM, http://www.crudethe
movie.com/awards-and-festivals, (last visited March 18, 2015).
58. 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (2012).
59. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2012).
60. Amended Complaint at 3, Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 886 F. Supp. 2d 235
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 11 Civ. 0691).
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rean nationals.61 The two-hundred-page complaint filed by Chevron merely days prior to the Lago Agrio judgment being handed
down in Ecuador, described in great detail many instances of
alleged fraud, corruption, misrepresentation, pressure tactics, and
collusion with Ecuadorean government officials, obstruction in
United States courts, and falsification of documents. The complaint listed nine claims for relief, including fraud, tortious interference with contract, trespass to chattels, unjust enrichment,
civil conspiracy, violation of New York Judiciary Law §487, and a
declaratory judgment that the decision issued by the court of
Sucumbı́os against Chevron is unenforceable and nonrecognizable.
The last claim for relief listed in the complaint was undoubtedly the most important piece toward advancing Chevron’s immediate goals, for it aimed directly at blocking the recognition and
enforcement of the impending Ecuadorean judgment in the United
States. At the same time of filing the RICO Complaint, Chevron
also brought an action against the legal representatives of the
Ecuadorean plaintiffs seeking preliminary injunction principally
to bar enforcement outside of ROE of multibillion dollar judgment
entered against corporation in Ecuadorean provincial court.62
Chevron’s request offered a detailed recount of how Ecuador
lacked impartial courts that violated international and domestic
due process, and how plaintiffs had engaged in fraudulent activities to procure a judgment against Chevron.63 Despite the gravity
of these allegations, Chevron’s petition had a fundamental problem because, at the time of filing the request for preliminary
injunction, there was simply no Ecuadorean judgment; the
Sucumbı́os court had not issued it yet. The judgment did not come
out until February 14, 2011, i.e. two weeks after Chevron’s preemptive request against it.
Roughly a month later, the New York Court issued a lengthy
order whereby it granted a preliminary injunction “against all
defendants other than Stratus Consulting, Douglas Beltman and
Ann Maest,”64 and thereby enjoined and restrained them “from
directly or indirectly funding, commencing, prosecuting, advancing in any way, or receiving benefit from any action or proceeding,
outside the Republic of Ecuador, for recognition or enforcement of
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 1.
See Donziger, 886 F. Supp. 2d at 594.
Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232, 240 (2d Cir. 2012).
See Donziger, 886 F. Supp. 2d at 660.
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the Judgment previously rendered in Maria Aguinda y otros v.
Chevron Corporation, No. 002-2003 (. . .) or any other judgment
that hereafter may be rendered in the Lago Agrio Case by that
court or by any other court in Ecuador in or by reason of the Lago
Agrio Case . . . .”65 The District Court’s decision was appealed by
the plaintiffs’ lawyers, and after briefing, the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit of New York reversed the Order and vacated
the preliminary injunction, concluding that Chevron’s theory of
New York’s Uniform Foreign Money Judgments Recognition Act
did not support the injunction it sought.66
After analyzing the facts and circumstances of the case, the
Court of Appeals noted “the Recognition Act nowhere authorizes a
court to declare a foreign judgment unenforceable on the preemptive suit of a putative judgment-debtor.”67 The Court was troubled
by the fact that the finality, conclusiveness, and enforceability of
the Ecuadorean judgment did not precede the invocation of the
Recognition Act, therefore leaving the injunction with no legal
basis.68 Moreover, such basis could only exist when “judgmentcreditors affirmatively seek to enforce their judgment in a court
governed by New York or similar law.”69 With regard to the overreaching effect of the District Court’s injunction beyond the territory of the United States, the Court of Appeals concluded that the
District Court had abused its discretion, and then established that
“permitting such speculative declaratory relief would encourage
efforts by parties to seek a res judicata advantage by litigating
issues in New York in order to obtain advantage in connection
with potential enforcement efforts in other countries.”70
Despite the setback caused by the reversal of the preliminary
injunction, the RICO litigation continued its course, and after a
very intense trial on March 4, 2014, the District Court issued a
497-page opinion whereby it granted Chevron total relief.71 The
ruling determined that the lawyers who represented Aguinda and
others “procured the judgment by fraud and through violation of
the RICO statute,”72 and therefore enjoined them “from instituting
65. Id.
66. Naranjo, 667 F.3d at 239.
67. Id. at 240.
68. Id. at 242.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 245-46.
71. See generally Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 974 F. Supp. 2d 362 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)
(hereinafter SDNY’s RICO Decision March 4, 2014).
72. Id. at 481.
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any enforcement proceedings in the United States.”73 Furthermore, the District Court created a constructive trust for Chevron’s
benefit on any rights, including legal fees, other payments, and
property pertaining to Donziger and his other co-defendants in
connection with the Lago Agrio litigation.74 The co-defendants
filed an appeal, which as of March 2015, is still pending.
As early as 2004, prior to Chevron’s anti-enforcement strategy in the judicial and international arbitration realms, the multinational oil company had begun mounting a political and
economic pressure campaign against the ROE consisting, among
other things, of the filing before the Office of the United States
Trade Representative of a Petition Requesting Withdrawal or Suspension of the Designation of Ecuador as an Andean Trade Preference Act Beneficiary Country.75 The petition, which Chevron has
repeatedly filed roughly every four years, is based on the alleged
questionable conduct of the Ecuadorean government in failing to
abide by their obligations to recognize and respect the rights of
Chevron as a United States citizen.
In the last iteration of Chevron’s petition, submitted in 2012,
the American company based its request for sanctions on “Ecuador’s failure to act in good faith in recognizing as binding or in
enforcing an award in the pending Chevron v. Ecuador arbitration,” and on their “gross improprieties and denials of basic fairness and due process,” during the handling of the Lago Agrio
litigation by Ecuadorean courts.76 These acts, Chevron concluded,
had caused Ecuador to cease “to meet the criterion requiring it to
act in good faith in recognizing as binding and enforcing an arbitral tribunal’s award,” and thus justified its withdrawal from the
list of ATPA beneficiary countries.77
While Chevron has continued to broaden its counterattacks
against the Lago Agrio plaintiffs, the ROE, and all persons who
assisted them in this legal saga, Aguinda and the rest of the indig73. Id. at 479.
74. Id. at 478.
75. Petition Requesting Withdrawal or Suspension of the Designation of Ecuador
as an Andean Trade Preference Act Beneficiary Country from Chevron Corporation,
Country submitted to Mr. Bennett Harman, Chairman of the Andean Subcommittee,
Trade Policy Staff Committee, Office of the United States Trade Representative
(September 17, 2012), available at https://lettersblogatory.com/wp-content/uploads/
2012/09/Chevron-comment.pdf (hereinafter Chevron’s ATPA Petition Against
Ecuador).
76. Id. at ¶ 4.
77. Id. at ¶ 11; see also Andean Trade Preference Act, or “ATPA” 19 U.S.C. § 3202
(2012).
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enous peoples from Ecuador have struggled to obtain the recognition and enforcement of the 2011 judgment that made Chevron
liable for Texaco’s conduct in the Ecuadorean Amazon. Recognition and enforcement efforts have been sought in Argentina, Brazil and Canada, with no results to this date.78 Aguinda’s quest for
justice appears to have fallen through a rabbit hole of sorts and
into a surreal world where the center of attention has been progressively drifting away from the environmental tort action that
brought the parties to seek judicial remedies in the first place.
Largely due to Chevron’s multifaceted counter attack strategy, what started as a group action for the protection of environmental and related rights more than two decades ago has
morphed into something entirely different that goes beyond the
simple attempt to block the recognition of a foreign judgment. To
anyone following the intricate Chevron Ecuador legal saga, upon
every new twist, this case appears to be much less about the protection of collective rights than it is about the display of seemingly
unlimited litigation resources, creative lawyering, political power,
and the maneuvering of dispute processing mechanisms and fora
in the pursuit of self-interested goals. Notwithstanding this
deviation, it is still worthwhile looking at the Aguinda litigation in
the realm of the protection of collective rights in Ecuador, and we
now turn to it.

III. THE ELUSIVE PROTECTION OF DIFFUSE
RIGHTS IN ECUADOR
As mentioned in the previous section, the Ecuadorean action
filed on behalf of Aguinda and others against Chevron in 2003 was
novel. EMA was the first statute of its nature adopted by the
South American nation. It was also the first time anyone other
than the government was given standing to bring an action created to protect collective interests and seek compensation and not
just injunctive relief.79 Furthermore, EMA allowed the plaintiff of
an environmental group action to pursue their claim through summary and verbal proceedings as opposed to the long ordinary
trial.80 The statute also broadened the scope of judicial authority
by allowing the judge to calculate the amount of damages to be
awarded, allocate any monies directly to the victims, and desig78. For a detailed discussion about the enforcement actions, see Gómez, Global
Chase, supra note 7.
79. LEY DE GESTIÓN AMBIENTAL, Law No. 99-37, art. 43.
80. Id.

R
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nate a third party to carry out any activities or reparations
needed.81 This specific feature of EMA could be deemed as opening the door to judicially supervised remedies in Ecuador. Finally,
as a way to stimulate the filing of group actions for the environment, EMA gave plaintiffs the right to collect a fee equivalent to
ten percent of the total monies awarded for damages.82
Regardless of whether EMA resulted from the lobbying efforts
of the Lago Agrio plaintiffs or some of their supporters,83 the passage of the statute was undoubtedly a positive signal. For one, it
helped bring Ecuador up to speed with several other countries in
the region such as Brazil and Colombia, which had already
embraced group litigation in one form or another.84
The availability of EMA was also one of the main reasons why
the United States court considered Ecuador as an adequate alternative forum and dismissed the Aguinda class action back in
2001.85 The movement toward the enactment of class action-like
procedures in Latin America for the protection of individual, collective, and diffuse rights had begun as early as the nineties during the wave of constitutional reforms,86 but the adoption of
specific legislation took much longer.87 As a result, despite an
increasingly active policy debate on the need to enable aggregate
litigation in the region, Latin American parties were still
attracted to United States courts and to the perceived advantages
of the American legal system.88
Another positive trait of EMA was the fact that by giving anyone standing to sue and not just to the direct victims, EMA created a mechanism of public participation whereby the citizenry
was empowered to protect the environment.89 Moreover, the right
to file a collective action was granted not only to individuals, but
also to any entity or group, thus opening the possibility to advocacy groups and non-governmental organization to become effectively engaged in litigation. In addition to the statutory remedies
created by EMA, Ecuadorean citizens retained the possibility of
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See SAWYER, supra note 24, at 77; see also SDNY’s RICO Decision March 4
2014, supra note 71, at 15.
84. See generally Gómez, Group Litigation in Latin America, supra note 11
(discussing in detail the development of aggregate litigation in Latin America).
85. See Aguinda, Dismissal Stipulation and Order, supra note 21.
86. Id. at 492.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 493.
89. Id. at 29, 41, 42.
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filing an extraordinary writ of amparo where violations are
deemed to have affected the Constitution.90
Given the high stakes of the Aguinda litigation, the handling
of a seemingly straightforward collective action set forth in article
43 of EMA became a gargantuan enterprise for the Lago Agrio
court. Besides a series of preliminary objections submitted by
Chevron alleging the lack of jurisdiction of the Sucumbı́os court
and the lack of standing of Chevron,91 one of the most hotly
debated issues was the appointment of an expert to assist the
judge in determining the extent of the harm attributed to Chevron, so he could then calculate the damages. After a highly contentious exchange between the parties and multiple attempts to
attack the credibility of the parties’ own experts,92 the presiding
judge appointed Richard Cabrera, who, after carrying out multiple
site inspections, issued a report that served as the basis for the
trial court’s decision.93 Unsurprisingly, Chevron’s lawyers aggressively contested the report, which assessed damages for US $27
billion. The challenge was not only to the report and its methodology, but also, more importantly, to the alleged misconduct of
expert Cabrera during the litigation, and to the possibility that his
report might have been ghostwritten by plaintiffs.94 These and
other allegations of serious misconduct were later used in the
RICO proceedings in the United States to demonstrate Chevron’s
assertions of widespread fraud and corruption.95
The final judgment issued by the Sucumbı́os court was
deemed to prove the harm attributed to Chevron, and devised
three types of remedies: principal measures (medidas principales)
“destined to restore the natural resources to their original state as
soon as possible”;96 supplementary measures (medidas complementarias), which aim to “offer compensation when restoration is
not possible and compensate for the time passed without remedy”,97 and; mitigation measures (medidas de mitigación), geared
to “reduce and attenuate the effect of damages that are impossible
to remedy.” The court devised a detailed scheme to materialize its
90. Id. at art. 41.
91. Aguinda v. Chevron, Sucumbı́os Judgment, February 14 2011 at 3.
92. See Chevron RICO Complaint, supra note 39, at 19-22.
93. Id. at 62.
94. Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr., Ten Lessons from the Chevron Litigation: The
Defense Perspective, 1 STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. 199, 224 (2013).
95. See Chevron RICO Complaint, supra note 39, at 47.
96. Aguinda v. Chevron, Sucumbı́os Judgment, February 14, 2011, at 177.
97. Id.
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award, including an order to establish a health program to benefit
the affected communities,98 and a mitigation plan for harms
inflicted on the culture of the indigenous groups affected by Texaco’s activities.99
In order to administer the award monies, the court ordered
the plaintiffs to establish a trust fund within sixty days of the
judgment in favor of the Amazon Defense Front (Frente de
Defensa de la Amazonı́a, or ADF), or the persons designated by
ADF. ADF is a non-governmental private organization formed in
1994 to organize and protect the rights of those affected by oil
operations in the Orellana and Sucumbı́os provinces of the
Oriente region.100 The Ministry of Social Welfare of Ecuador
approved ADF in 1998, and twenty other organizations are members.101 Even though the use of judicially created compensation
funds is commonplace in United States mass tort litigation,102 the
establishment of a compliance mechanism that involved an entity
such as ADF was unprecedented in Ecuador.
The potential advantages of this solution included the possibility of allowing the victims to obtain a direct benefit from the
judgment, the legitimacy of the mechanism, and the possibility of
having external agencies oversee the remediation process. Notwithstanding, the Sucumbı́os court did not make the system
accountable, nor did it implement a monitoring mechanism to
evaluate and supervise the ADF and its representatives. Also, by
allowing ADF to name a third party to administer the funds and
carry out the remediation, the court left open the door to potential
mismanagement and manipulation by the parties.
The purported control of ADF by Donziger and his associates
is precisely what Chevron alleged during the RICO litigation, and
what the federal judge observed in its decision to allow the fraud
claims.103 In order to show the existence of a conflict of interest
between ADF and the Lago Agrio plaintiff, the United States
judge in charge of the RICO case also highlighted that the head of
98. Id.
99. Id. at 183-84.
100. THE FRONT FOR THE DEFENSE OF THE AMAZON, http://www.ecuanex.net.ec/fda/
fda.htm
101. Id.
102. See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix & Kristen B. Stewart, The September 11th Victim
Compensation Fund: Fund Approaches to Resolving Mass Tort Litigation, 9 CONN.
INS. L.J. 121 (2002-03); Linda S. Mullenix, Prometheus Unbound: The Gulf Coast
Claims Facility as a Means for Resolving Mass Tort Claims – A Fund Too Far, 71(3)
LA. L. REV. 819 (2011).
103. See SDNY’s RICO Decision March 4 2014, supra note 71, at 16.
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ADF, Luis Yanza, “has been paid throughout from funds raised to
finance the case,”104 and that “Donziger even purchased a residence for him out of personal funds, through this expense ultimately was reimbursed to Donziger by the Kohn firm”.105
Regardless of the outcome of the RICO litigation and whether
there indeed was corruption in the handling of the Ecuadorean
proceedings, it is evident that the compliance mechanism devised
by the Sucumbı́os court felt short of meeting its goal. Even if
Chevron had not challenged the Lago Agrio litigation, this judicially-created compensation mechanism did not consider some
important aspects such as accountability and monitoring of the
system, and it also failed to screen and oversee those in charge of
it. Unfortunately, the losers in this battle will be—time and
again—those who were supposed to be made whole in the first
place.

IV. CONCLUSION
The convoluted nature of the ongoing Chevron-Ecuador legal
saga makes it difficult to summarize the myriad of procedural
twists and turns during more than two decades of legal wrangling
in several jurisdictions. Perhaps driven by the lawyers involved or
by others who always looked at the trees and definitely ignored
the forest, what began as a relatively simple and straightforward
environmental damage lawsuit on behalf of indigenous peoples of
the Ecuadorean Amazon, ended up becoming the judicial version
of a hydra—the mythical multi-headed monster that grew a new
head every time it lost another. Each new proceeding, petition, or
mechanism pursued in this case reveals a new level of lawyerly
creativity, but also moves the case further from why it started in
the first place. Although this may obviously be seen as an unfortunate feature, on the other hand, this multilayered reality can
also be seen as a living laboratory that help us see the complexities of protecting collective rights in a globalized society.
Despite the unfortunate turn of events in Ecuador, the misconduct of the plaintiffs’ representatives, the seemingly extravagant defense strategy pursued by Chevron, and the mishandling
of the Lago Agrio litigation by the Sucumbı́os court, the ChevronEcuador saga has helped accelerate the discussion about the protection of environmental and indigenous rights in the South
104. Id. at 28.
105. Id.
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American nation, and has also brought to the table many issues
that need to be addressed in order to attain the effective safeguard
of collective rights in our modern society. As Judge Kaplan
pointed out during the conclusion of his ruling in the RICO litigation, “the saga of the Lago Agrio case is sad.”106 Aguinda and the
other class members may not see redress anytime soon for Chevron has vowed to fight this case “until hell freezes over—and then
out on the ice.”107 But even if they are ever able to effectively
enforce the judgment against Chevron, the inherent deficiencies of
the judicially-created mechanism for the disbursement and management of the award monies, and the unfortunate circumstances
surrounding the parties’ manipulation of the process, are likely to
affect its effectiveness, create uncertainty, and jeopardize any
value that might come out of it.

106. Id. at 484.
107. Patrick Radden Keefe, Reversal of Fortune, THE NEW YORKER (January 9,
2012), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/01/09/reversal-of-fortune-patrickradden-keefe.
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